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THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE AS APPLIED
IN MARYLAND
(Herein of the Revocability of Certain Trusts)
By RusSELu R. RENO*
T

DOCTRINE

Early in the history of the common law there developed
a doctrine that "a man cannot raise a fee simple to his own
right heirs by the name of heirs as a purchase neither by
conveyance of land, nor by use, nor by devise".' This
meant that by neither a deed nor a will could a grantor
or testator create in his own heirs the same estate in quality and quantity that such heirs would inherit by descent.
In other words a title acquired by descent was considered
superior to or more worthy than a title acquired by purchase. 2 Therefore, if a deed or will purported to create in
an heir the same estate in quality and quantity that such
heir would inherit by descent if the limitation were declared void, the heir was considered to have taken by descent and not by purchase. Today we speak of this doctrine as the doctrine of "worthier title". As applied to
wills the doctrine is often stated as follows: "Whenever a
devise gives to the heir the same estate in quality as he
3
would have by descent, he shall take by the latter .. .The historical reasons for the development of this doctrine are obscure, but probably it developed for the protection of the rights of third persons in two situations where
such protection did not exist if the heir took by purchase.
There were certain valuable feudal obligations such as
* A. B., 1931, LL.B., 1927, University of Illinois; Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1 Counden v. Clerke, Hob. 30, 80 Eng. Repr. 180.
2 By "purchase" is meant by deed or will. It has no reference to whether
a valuable consideration was paid. The term "purchase" is here used in
contradistinction to "descent". See Bouvier's Law Dictionary defining
"purchase" as: "A term including every mode of acquisition of estate
known to the law, except that by which an heir on the death of his ancestor
becomes substituted in his place as owner by operation of law."
8 1 Co. Litt. (1st Amer. Ed. from 19th Eng. Ed. 1853, by Hargrave &
Butler) 12 b, n. (2).
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wardship and marriage which existed in the overlord when
the heir took by descent, but which did not exist if he took
by purchase. It was probably for the protection of the
overlord's feudal rights that the doctrine was first developed in England. In addition, prior to the enactment of
the Statute of Fraudulent Devises,4 land which passed by
devise was not subject to the payment of the ancestor's
debts, while land which passed by descent was subject to
such debts. The doctrine therefore operated to prevent a
testator from defrauding his creditors by conveying the
same estate to his heirs that they would have inherited by
descent.
After the abolishment of the principal feudal obligations in 16605 and the enactment of the Statute of Fraudulent Devises (making land which passes by devise subject
to the debts of the testator) the reasons for the development of the doctrine ceased to exist. The doctrine was so
deeply rooted in the common law, however, that it has
survived in most jurisdictions to the present time. To
what extent it presents a hazard to the modern draftsman
will be the scope of inquiry of this article.

As

APPLIED TO WILLS

This doctrine has received its greatest application in the
will cases, because of the common desire of a testator to
leave some, if not all, of his property to those persons who
are his right heirs. It was first pronounced by our Court
of Appeals in Medley v. Williams6 as follows:
"It is a case then in which the same quantity and
quality of estate is devised, as the devisee would have
acquired by descent, and in such a case, it is a clear
rule of the common law, that the title shall vest by the
worthier title-by descent, and not by devise".
'3 & 4 Will. & M., Ch. 14 (1691).
12 Car. II, Ch. 24 (1660).
7 G. & J. 61 (Md. 1835).
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Same Quantity and Quality

In determining whether the "same quantity and quality
of estate" is devised as the devisee would have acquired by
descent, the limitation to the heir must be disregarded as if
it had never been written. If under these circumstances
the devisee would have inherited by descent an estate of
the same quantity and quality, then the doctrine is applied
and the heir takes by descent and not by purchase.7 In
applying this formula care must be taken to disregard only
the limitation to the heir himself, and not to disregard limitations to third persons, even though such limitations are
coupled with the devise to the heir. The doctrine does not
in any way affect the validity of any limitations to third
persons. In applying the formula one must not fall into
the error of determining what estate the heir would have
inherited if the testator had died intestate.'
Under this formula for applying the doctrine it can
readily be seen that the existence of a divesting limitation
in the form of an executory interest over to a third person,
imposed on a devise to an heir, will not prevent the application of the doctrine.' Since the executory interest is
valid irrespective of whether the heir takes by descent or
by purchase, he will take the same estate by descent that
he would by purchase, i. e., a fee simple subject to an
executory interest. If he takes by descent the executory
interest operates as a springing fee, while if he takes by
purchase it operates as a shifting fee, but in either case
the heir's estate is subject to a valid executory interest.
The same result is reached if a charge is imposed upon a
devise to an heir. 10 The charge will be enforced against
the land whether the heir takes by descent or by purchase,
so his estate will be of the "same quantity and quality".
Kent, Commentaries, Part VI, 506.
8 This was the error of the court in McDaniel v. Allen, 64 Miss. 417, 1 So.
356 (1887) where the court in determining whether the heir would have
inherited the "same quantity and quality of estate" proceeded to disregard all limitations to third persons and assume that the testator had
died intestate.
Manbridge v. Plummer, 2 My. & K. 92, 39 Bng. Repr. 879 (1833).
10 Clarke v. Smith, 1 Comyns 73, 92 Eng. Repr. 965 (1698).
7
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This manner of applying the doctrine was followed in Mitchell v. Mitchell," where the devise was made subject to
a charge of an annuity. The presence of this charge upon
the devise did not prevent the Court applying the rule of
worthier title, so that the devisee took by descent and not
by purchase.
In applying this formula where the devise to the heir is
preceded by an estate in a third person, a distinction must
be drawn between the cases where the limitation to the
heir operates as a remainder and those where it operates as
an executory interest. Where the limitation to the heir
operates as a remainder, the striking out of the limitation
to the heir does not enlarge the preceding particular estate,
and therefore the heir will take a reversion by descent of
"the same quantity and quality" as the remainder devised
in the will. In both Philips v. Dashiell'2 and Mitchell v.
Mitchell' 3 the doctrine of worthier title was applied to a
remainder following a life estate. On the other hand, if
the devise to the heir operates as an executory interest
divesting an estate in fee devised to a third person, the
doctrine will not be applicable. In such a case the striking
out of the limitation to the heir would operate to enlarge
the preceding estate to the third person from fee simple
subject to an executory interest into a fee simple absolute.'4 This would leave no estate to pass by descent to
the heir, and thus he would not take by descent an estate
of "the same quantity or quality" that he would have taken
5
by devise.'
1121

Md. 244 (1864).

12 1 H. & J. 478 (Md. 1804).

"Supra n. 11.
"2 Restatement, Property (1936) Sec. 229.
15 If the limitation to the third person can be construed to be a fee simple
with an executory interest rather than a fee simple 8ubject to an executory
interest (see Sec. 47 Restatement of Property), then the striking out of the
executory interest will not enlarge the preceding estate into a fee simple
absolute, but will convert it into a determinable fee simple estate with a
possibility of reverter in the testator's heirs by descent; and thus an estate of
the "same quantity and quality" as he would have taken under the executory interest by devise. This is the type of estate set out in the example
in 1 Simes, Future Interests (1936) Sec. 264. However, in Starr v. Starr
M. P. Church, 112 Md. 171, 76 A. 595 (1910), the existence of a fee simple
with an executory interest as distinguished from a fee simple 8ubject to
an executory interest was denied by inference.
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Suppose the devise to the heir is part of a limitation to
two or more heirs in equal shares, can the rule of worthier
title be applied? The answer depends on whether a devise
to two or more heirs creates an estate in each of "the same
quantity and quality" as they would have inherited by descent. Clearly if the two or more devisees take in severality, they do not take an estate of "the same quantity and
quality" that they would have taken by descent, since in
the latter case they would have taken under concurrent
ownership and not in severalty. However, if they take in
concurrent ownership under the devise, a more difficult
problem arises in determining whether the doctrine applies. Certainly if their concurrent ownership is in joint
tenancy, the presence of the right of survivorship, which
will exist if they take by purchase but will not exist if they
take by descent, will operate to make their estates of different quality. But, if they take as tenants in common,
there arises the question as to whether tenancy in coparcenary 6 is of "the same quantity and quality" as tenancy
in common. This problem could not arise under English
common law in respect to male heirs because of the rule of
primogeniture, but it did arise in connection with a devise
to two or more female heirs, since the rule of primogeniture did not apply to them and they would take as tenants
in coparcenary in case of descent. The English cases 17 took
the position that the estate of coparcenary was a different
estate in quality from tenancy in common, and therefore
the doctrine of worthier title could never be applied to a
devise to plural heirs. In this country because of the
abandonment of primogeniture, the distinctions between
tenancy in coparcenary and tenancy in common have
tended to disappear, and as a result the majority of the
American cases' s have applied the doctrine to plural heirs
as well as to a single heir. However, in Gilpin v. Hollings16 Where two or more heirs take by descent they take not as tenants in
common at common law but as tenants in coparcenary.
17 As in Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 431, 78 Eng. Repr. 671 (1505).
18 Wheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N. E. 502 (1912) ; Moninger &
Ringland v. Ramsey, 48 Iowa 369 (1878).
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worth 9 the Court of Appeals refused to apply the doctrine
to plural heirs because of the different quality of the estate
involved, respectively, in tenancy in coparcenary and tenancy in common. It was conceded that for almost all practical purposes there is no real difference between these
estates, yet the Court pointed out that in Maryland "they
are different as legal estates, and their qualities and incidents are not the same". This decision was subsequently
0
As a rereaffirmed and followed in Donnelly v. Turner."
sult of these cases the scope of the application of this doctrine has been greatly narrowed, so that it can only be
applied where the ancestor leaves a single heir and not
plural heirs.
Suppose in the case of a single heir, the devise is to such
heir and a third person in concurrent ownership, will the
heir take his undivided interest by descent under the doctrine? Here again, if the devise is in joint tenancy or
tenancy by the entireties, the heir can not take by descent
an estate of equal quality because the right of survivorship
can not exist if his undivided interest is acquired by descent. 2 If the devise purports to create tenancy in common, it can well be argued that the undivided interest of
the heir will pass by descent to him, since his share would
be held in tenancy in common whether arising by descent
or purchase. 2 Probably the correct solution would depend upon whether, by striking out the limitation to the
heir, the third person would take the entire fee or an undivided interest only. Certainly if the devise of the entire
fee is so worded that the deletion of the limitation to the
heir would operate to give the entire estate to the third
person, the doctrine has no application since the heir could
take no estate by descent; but if the wording is such that
the deletion of the limitation to the heir would not enlarge
the other's share, then the doctrine should be applied.
103 Md. 190 (1852).

20 60 Md. 81 (1883).
21 The four unities of time, title, interest, and possession are necessary to
have joint tenancy or tenancy by the entireties. Likewise neither estate
can be created by. operation of law.
"3Mr. Fearne was of the opinion that the doctrine would apply to the
heir's undivided interest. Fearne, Posthumous Works, 128 et 8eq.
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Designation of the Heir
Since the doctrine must be applied on the date of the
death of the testator, and since his heirs-at-law are then
and there determined, the doctrine is applicable to a devise
to an heir by his individual name as well as where the
23
devise is to "heirs" .as a class. In Philips v. Dashiell,
Medley v. Williams,24 and Posey v. Budd 25 the devises were
to the heirs under their individual names, yet the Court
applied the doctrine of worthier title. The fact that the
testator had designated his heir by name so as to indicate
an intention that such heir should take by purchase was
held to be immaterial, and the doctrine was applied as a
rule of law without regard to the intention of the testator.
A question might arise as to whether the application
of the Maryland lapse statute 6 to a devise to a presumptive
heir who had pre-deceased the testator would prevent the
doctrine of worthier title from being applied. Since the
lapse statute does not pass the devised property to the deceased devisee's heirs by descent but substitutes them in
his place as original takers,2 7 the question of the application of the doctrine of worthier title in such a situation
would depend upon whether the deceased devisee's heirs
were also the heirs of the testator. If they were not the
heirs of the testator then the doctrine has no application,
and they take by purchase from the testator as they could
not have taken by descent from him. On the other hand,
if these heirs of the deceased devisee, who are substituted
as original takers in the devise, are also heirs of the testator, then the doctrine should be applied, since if the devise
is stricken from the will they would then take by descent.2a
Where the devise is to "heirs" as a class without indicating them by name, the doctrine is clearly applicable,
"I H. & J. 478 (Md. 1804).
2- 7 G. & J. 61 (Md. 1835).
25 21 Md. 477 (1864).
"Md. Code (1924) Art 93, Sec. 335.
"See Glenn v. Belt, 7 G. & J. 362 (Md. 1835) ; and McLaughlin v. McGee,
131 Md. 156, 101 A. 682 (1917).
" Sedgwick v. Mlnot, 88 Mass. 171 (1863).
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with the limitation in Maryland that it will not apply if the
class shall consist of more than a single heir. In Mitchell
v. Mitchell29 the doctrine was applied to a devise to the
testator's "right heirs" where there existed only a single
heir. Likewise the fact that the devise was to a class
under the description of testator's "children" or "issue"
would not prevent the application of the rule. In Gilpin v.
Hollingsworth ° the Court assumed that the doctrine would
have applied to a devise to "all my children" if the class
had contained only a single heir and not plural heirs.
However, if the class is to be ascertained at a date subsequent to the death of the testator, then the doctrine can
have no appplication; for at that date the class may contain
persons who were not heirs of the testator at his death, or
may exclude persons who were heirs of the testator at his
death." If the doctrine is to be applicable, it must be
applied at the date that the instrument becomes effective,
i. e., the time of testator's death, and not on the basis of
subsequent developments. 2 At that date the identity of
the devisee as an heir must be determined.
Since a surviving spouse has been made a statutory
heir, should the doctrine of worthier title be applied to a
devise to a surviving spouse? The doctrine originated in
connection with the common law heirs, who did not include a surviving spouse. If it is extended to apply to
statutory heirs such as a surviving spouse, a difficulty is
presented that does not exist in the case of common law
heirs. A surviving spouse as a statutory heir is a "forced
heir" in that he or she cannot be disinherited by the will.
The very fact that such a spouse is given an election to
take as a statutory heir or as a devisee or legatee under the
will indicates an intention of the legislature not to have
such statutory heirs subject to this common law doctrine.8 3
2921 Md. 244 (1864).
803 Md. 190 (1852).

812 Sears v. Russell, 74 Mass. 86 (1857).
' Landic v. Simms, 1 App. D. C. 507 (1893).
'See Harper and Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title (1930)
24 Iii. L. Rev. 627, for an excellent argument against the extension of the
doctrine to "forced heirs".
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Fortunately Maryland has never extended the doctrine to
include such "forced heirs". 4
Effect Upon the Heir
Although the common law may have looked upon a title
by descent as being more worthy than one by purchase, yet
from the viewpoint of the heir a title by purchase may be
more beneficial than one by descent. Under our rules for
the settling of decedents' estates, land which passes as intestate property must first be used to pay debts before any
land specifically devised is so used. Likewise intestate real
property can be sold to raise sufficient funds to pay pecuniary legacies, while the same land if specifically devised
would not be subject to such a sale. If the doctrine is to
be applied as a rule of law where there is a devise to an
heir, it logically follows that the land passes as intestate
property and is therefore subject to prior use for the payment of debts and also for sale to pay pecuniary legacies.
This result was reached in Mitchell v. Mitchell8 where an
annuity was charged against all of the testator's realty.
Since part of the land had been devised to an heir, the
Court held that the primary obligation to pay this annuity
rested upon this land, which the heir took by descent under
the doctrine of worthier title.
"In this case we consider the title of the appellant
to 'Myrtle Grove' as simply a title by descent, standing
upon the same ground as if it had not been mentioned
in the will. And under the established law of this
State, it must be held as chargeable with the whole
annuity, to the exoneration of 'Hunting Fields', which
was specifically devised."
It must be noted that in this case the devise to the heir
was not a devise to her by name, but a devise to the testator's "right heirs". In its opinion the Court did not repudiate the English case of Biederman v. Seymour, 6 but con34 Two jurisdictions have extended the doctrine to include "forced heirs".
Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 89 N. E. 314 (1909) ; Herring v. Herring, 187 Iowa 593, 174 N. W. 364 (1919).
35 21 Md. 244 (1864).
303 Beavan 368, 49 Eng. Repr. 144 (1841).
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tended that the case in question could be distinguished on
the fact that the devise did not designate the heir by name
but used the class description "right heirs". In the latter
case the English court had held that the application of the
doctrine of worthier title would not, as between the heir
and the other devisees, require that the land devised to the
former be applied in payment of debts in priority to land
devised to the latter. The intention of a testator, as to the
order in which his assets are to be marshalled in the payment of debts, can be followed even though a devisee takes
his estate by descent; and the fact that the estate was specifically devised to an heir is proof of the intention of the
testator that such land should only be required to bear
its pro rata share of the debts along with all other lands
specifically devised. The inference that can be drawn from
the opinion in the Maryland case is that, if the devise is to
the heir by name and not under the class description
"heirs", then an intention of the testator to marshall his
assets, so that the land devised to the heir will only have to
bear its pro rata share of the debts along with other lands
specifically devised, can be drawn from the will, even
though the doctrine of worthier title is applied to the devise to the heir.
Probably the most frequent and clear results of the doctrine appeared in litigation over the descent of "ancestral
estates". Prior to 1916 the Maryland statutes provided a
different course of descent for lands acquired by descent
than for lands acquired by purchase. Thus in case of intestacy the first question was whether the decedent had
acquired his land by descent or by purchase. If he had
acquired any land by devise from his own ancestor, the
doctrine of worthier title might operate to vest it in him
by descent, and thereby change the course of descent of
this land at his death. In Philips v. Dashiell,87 Medley v.
Williams,3 and Posey v. Budd 9 the doctrine was applied to
lands held by a decedent so as to change the course of de3'1 H. & J. 478 (Md. 1804).
387 G. & J. 61 (Md. 1835).

39 21 Md. 477 (1864).
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scent from that which would have applied if the decedent
had held the lands by purchase.
It has been assumed that the abolishment of "ancestral
estates" in the Statute of Descents of 191640 has eliminated
the doctrine of worthier title from consideration in determining the course of descent in case of intestacy. This is
true in the case of possessory estates. But as was pointed
out in a previous article in this REviIw, 41 the course of descent of future interests in Maryland is still determined by
the common law canon that "seisin or purchase shall be the
stock of descent". Therefore, if the decedent is the owner
of a future interest in land at his death intestate, the course
of descent will depend upon whether he acquired such interest by descent or purchase. If he acquired it by descent, he cannot be a stock of descent, and the interest will
pass not to his heirs but to the next heir of his ancestor.
If he acquired it by purchase, the interest will pass by descent to his own heirs. Thus, as long as the course of descent of future interests in Maryland is determined by the
common law, the doctrine of worthier title may still be applied to change the course of descent, where the heir subsequently dies intestate while owning a future interest. To
date our Court of Appeals has not been confronted with an
application of the doctrine while determining the course
of descent of a future interest.
As

APPLIED TO CONVEYANCES

INTER VIVOS

In the development of this doctrine in the early common
law, its greatest application arose in will cases. However,
the rule was stated by all of the early English textwriters
as applying equally to conveyances inter vivos 2 With the
development of the trust device as a means whereby a settlor could create a trust for himself and wife during their
several lives, the doctrine became widely accepted and ap"oMd.

Code (1924) Art. 46, Secs. 1-4.

4 Reno, Alienability and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Mary-

land (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 89, 101 et seq.
11 See the statement of the doctrine by Hargrave In first sentence of
this article.
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plied in this country to remainders to the settlor's heirs-atlaw in conveyances inter vivos.43 The application of this
doctrine to such conveyances was first raised in Maryland
in Gordon v. Small. 4 In that case the Court recognized its
applicability to a remainder to a settlor's heirs-at-law in a
conveyance in trust, but held that it was not applicable in
that particular case upon other grounds. Subsequently, in
Warner v. Sprigg45 and Rafel v. Safe Deposit Co.46 the doctrine was applied so as to create a reversion in the settlor.
In neither case did the Court expressly recognize the fact
that they were dealing with the doctrine of worthier title,
but in both cases a remainder to the settlor's heirs-at-law
was construed to be a reversion left in the settlor himself.
Same Quantity and Quality
As previously pointed out in the will cases, the requirement that the estate be of the "same quantity and quality"
has operated in Maryland to restrict its appplication to devises to single heirs. This restriction is based upon the
recognized distinction between tenancy in common and
tenancy in coparcenary. The same argument is equally
pertinent in the application of the doctrine to conveyances
inter vivos. Under a remainder to the grantor's heirs in
a conveyance inter vivos, the heirs, if more than one, would
take a remainder by purchase as tenants in common, while
if they took a reversion by descent they would take in coparcenary. However, in none of the Maryland cases which
discuss the application of the doctrine to a conveyance
inter vivos has this limitation been recognized or even discussed.4 7 It is doubtful whether such a limitation on the
applicability of the doctrine is feasible, since the doctrine
18 See Simes, op. cit. supra n. 15, Sec.146, n. 14, for a list of cases which
have applied the doctrine to remainders to the settlor's heirs in conveyances inter vivos. Over two-thirds of these cases have been decided since
1900.
4 53 Md. 550 (1880).
The doctrine had been applied by the trial court.
45 62 Md. 14 (1884).

"100 Md. 141, 59 A. 702 (1905).

"In Miller v. Fleming, 7 Mackey 139 (D. C. 1889) this argument was advanced, but the District of Columbia court rejected it and held that the
grantor took a reversion under the doctrine.
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must be applied at the date of the execution of the conveyance and not at the death of the grantor. At that date it is
impossible to know whether there will be a single heir or
plural heirs. In the will cases this 'difficulty does not exist,
since the doctrine is applied at the time the will takes
effect. At that date the testator is dead and the number of
heirs is ascertainable.
Designation of the Heir
In the will cases the doctrine was applied to a devise to
an heir by his individual name, since the doctrine was
appplicable at the date that the will became effective, and
at that date, the testator being dead, the named devisee
would be his heir. However, in the deed cases it can have
no appplication to a remainder to a named person, who is a
presumptive heir of the grantor. Since the doctrine must
be applied at the date of the execution of the deed, it cannot be said with certainty that the named person will be
the heir of the grantor at his death. The death of such a
presumptive heir prior to that of the grantor would change
the class of persons who would take by descent a reversion,48 and therefore it cannot be said that he would have
taken an estate of the "same quantity and quality" by descent that he would by purchase.
This limits the appplication of the doctrine in cases of
conveyances inter vivos to remainders to the grantor's
heirs under the class description "heirs" or words of similar import. In Raffel v. Safe Deposit Co.4 9 the remainder
was to "vest in her next of kin or heirs according to law".
Whether a class description not using the words "heirs"
or "next of kin" would be sufficient to make the doctrine
applicable, would depend upon whether the description
would include all possible heirs of the grantor at his death
and exclude any person who would not be an heir at that
,8 Persons taking by right of representation take as original heirs of the
intestate, and not through their predeceased parent who was a presumptive
heir.
9 Supra, n. 46.
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date.5 0 . In Warner v. Sprigg51 such a description existed
where the remainder was "to go according to law, under
the existing statutory provisions of Maryland". This expression is equivalent to the use of the term "heirs-at-law"
in describing the class to take.52 In this connection it must
be noted that the "heirs" must be ascertainable at the
grantor's death and not at a date subsequent thereto, 53 and
also under the statutes of descent in effect at that date and
not at the date of the execution of the deed. If both factors
are not present in the class description, then the persons to
take by purchase might not be the same as those who
would take by descent. In Pope v. Safe Deposit and Trust
Co.54 the doctrine was held not to be applicable because the
heirs-at-law of the grantor were to be determined "under
the laws of the State of Maryland, in force at the time of
the execution and delivery of said original trust deed" and
not at the death of the grantor. Likewise in Kensett v.
Safe Deposit and Trust Co.5 5 the doctrine was not applicable since the remainder was to "such persons as would
by the now existing laws be the next of kin".
Since 1916 the devolution of title in case of intestacy is
the same in respect to personalty and realty, so the terms
"heirs-at-law" and "next of kin" are interchangeable, as
they include the same class membership. But prior to that
date the statutes of descent for the two types of property
were not the same, so these terms might include different
class members. Thus in Gordon v. Small" the doctrine of
worthier title was held not applicable to a remainder to the
5 In Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill. 488, 128 N. E. 518 (1920), the doctrine
was incorrectly applied to a remainder to the grantor's "lineal descendants,
per stirpes". This class description would not include collaterals of the
grantor, who would be his heirs-at-law if he died without lineal descendants surviving.
" Supra n. 45.
r1 Quaere. What is meant by the term "existing statutory provisions of
Maryland"? See discussion infra.
"Mercer v. Safe Deposit Co., 91 Md. 102, 45 A. 865 (1900) held that in
a remainder to the grantor's "right heirs" the class was to be ascertained
at the death of the grantor and not when the estate would fall into possession.
163 Md. 239, 161 A. 404 (1932).
55 116 Md. 526, 82 A. 981 (1911).
5653 Md. 550 (1880).
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grantor's "right heirs" where the subject-matter of the
trust was personalty, since the same persons would not
necessarily take by descent as would take by purchase.
Effect Upon the Heir
As has been pointed out in the will cases, the application
of the doctrine to a devise to an heir operates to render the
subject-matter of the devise intestate property, and therefore makes it subject to prior use in the payment of debts.
However, since the testator is dead at the time of the application of the doctrine, it does not operate to defeat the
estate of the heir, except in those cases .where the entire
property is exhausted in the payment of debts. On the
other hand, the application of the doctrine to a deed operates to defeat entirely the estate of the heir. Instead of
taking a remainder by purchase under the deed, he takes
an expectancy in a reversion left in the grantor. Having
only an expectancy in this reversion, he holds no interest
in the property capable of protection either in law or
equity. The grantor is the absolute owner of the reversion, and as such he has the power of disposition either by
conveyance inter vivos or by will, so as to defeat entirely
the heir's expectancy.
In several Maryland cases the principal problem at
issue was whether the grantor held a reversion under the
doctrine, so that by an inter vivos conveyance he could defeat the interest of the heir, who under the terms of the
deed claimed a remainder by purchase. In Warner v.
Sprigg5 a conveyance inter vivos by the grantor was upheld as conveying a reversion left in himself by virtue of
the gift of the remainder, following an equitable life estate
in the grantor, "to go according to law, under the existing
statutory provisions of Maryland". In this case the Court
did not expressly recognize the fact that it was dealing
with an application of the doctrine of worthier title, yet it
held that the gift of the remainder to the grantor's heirsat-law operated to create a reversion in the grantor and
57 62 Md. 14 (1884).
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not a remainder by purchase in such heirs. This is nothing
more than the application of the same doctrine of worthier
title developed in the will cases.
As most of the cases concerning remainders to the
grantor's heirs involve deeds in trust in which equitable
life estates are expressly created in the grantors, there exists not only the problem of whether the grantor holds a
reversion which he has power to dispose of by conveyance
inter vivos, but also the problem of whether the existence
of such a reversion gives him the additional power to revoke the trust. It'is a well settled rule in Maryland that a
trust may be terminated upon the request of all the beneficiaries."' It follows that if the grantor holds a reversion,
following an equitable life estate in himself, then he as sole
beneficiary has the power to revoke the trust and compel
the trustee to execute a reconveyance. This was the problem at issue in Raffel v. Safe Deposit Co.5 9 The grantor
had executed a deed in trust creating an equitable life
estate in herself with remainder to "her next of kin or heirs
according to law". No power of revocation of the trust
had been expressly reserved, but she was seeking to require a termination of the trust and reconveyance on the
ground that as owner of the reversion she was the sole
beneficiary. The Court, following Warner v. Sprigg,60 held
that she had not created a valid remainder, and therefore
as holder of the reversion and the equitable life estate she
was entitled to terminate the trust and have a reconveyance.
Not only may the expectancy of the heir in such a reversion be destroyed by a conveyance inter vivos, but also the
grantor's will may operate to devise the reversion to a
stranger, thereby defeating the expectancy of the heir. In
Warner v. Sprigg61 the Court expressly pointed out the fact
that the grantor's purported will would have operated to
dispose of the reversion arising under the application of
"8Manders v. Mercantile Trust Co., 147 Md. 448, 128 A. 145 (1925).
'o100 Md. 141, 59 A. 702 (1905).
1 iSupra n. 57.
WThbd.
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this doctrine, if he had not previously disposed of it by a
valid conveyance inter vivos. From these cases it becomes
apparent that the application of the doctrine to conveyances is much more detrimental to the interests of the heir
than is normally the situation when applied to a will. It is
of little wonder, then, that the Maryland cases, in construing a remainder to the grantor's heirs as creating a reversion in the grantor, have never expressly referred to the
doctrine as the doctrine of worthier title. From the viewpoint of the heir, it cannot be realistically stated that a
possible title by descent, a mere expectancy at the present,
is more worthy than a present title by purchase.
Applicable as a Rule of Law or a Rule of Construction?
In the application of the doctrine to wills no American
case has dissented from the statements in the early textbooks that it is a rule of law. 2 This is illustrated by the
willingness of the courts to apply the doctrine to a devise
to an heir by his individual name. 8 If it were a rule of
construction only, the fact that the testator used the heir's
individual name would be sufficient evidence of an intention that such heir should take by purchase to prevent its
application. However, in the application of the doctrine
to conveyances inter vivos, there has developed a strong
dissent to the effect that the doctrine is a rule of construction only and not a rule of law. Justice Cardozo very
64
clearly stated this view in Doctor v. Hughes as follows:
"At common law, therefore, and under common law
conveyances, this direction to transfer the estate to the
heirs of the grantor would indubitably have been
equivalent to the reservation of a reversion. In England, the rule has been changed by statute.
"But in the absence of modifying statute, the rule
persists today, at least as a rule of construction. ...
But at least the ancient rule survives to this extent,
62 See the statement of the doctrine by Hargrave in the first sentence of
this article.
18 Philips v. Dashiell, 8upra, n. 12; Medley v. Williams, supra n. 6; Posey
v. Budd, aupra n. 25.
-1225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1019).
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that, to transform into a remainder what would ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to work the transformation must be clearly expressed. Here there is
no clear expression of such a purpose, no doubt there
are circumstances on which it is possible to build an
argument."
Prior to its decision in Peter v. Peter65 the Court of Appeals of Maryland had made no express pronouncement as
to whether this doctrine should be applied to deeds as a
rule of law or merely as a rule of construction. In that
case the Court refused to apply the doctrine to a remainder
to the grantor's "heirs at law" with the following statement:
"As to the third point, which was most ably and
persuasively presented, it is unquestionably true that
at common law a grantor could not by deed convey an
estate in remainder to his own heirs, and a very high
authority, the late Major Venable, in his syllabus on
Real Property, declared that to be the law of this State
in reference to common law conveyances. But, assuming that to be true, as to such conveyances, it does
not. follow that a settlor may not, by a deed of trust,
create such an estate; and whatever the rule may be
in other jurisdictions, such remainders have been upheld by this Court in at least three cases, and in another case the principle was recognized."
The opinion further points out that the Sprigg case and
the Raffel case are not in conflict with this decision, because in those cases the Court found no express intention
of the grantor to create a remainder by purchase in his
heirs, and in those cases the Court did not intimate that a
reversion arose because of a rule of law that a remainder
to the grantor's heirs could not be validly created. The
only reasonable interpretation of the Peter case is not that
it overrules the Sprigg and Raffel cases and repudiates entirely the common law doctrine of worthier title, but that
the doctrine as appplied to deeds in trust should be applicable as a rule of construction, i. e., if there is no clear
65 136

Md. 157, 110 A. 211 (1920).
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evidence of the grantor's intention to create a remainder
by purchase in his heirs, a reversion in the grantor will
result, but the grantor may by evidence of his intention
create a remainder by purchase in his own heirs.
This interpretation of the Peter case was expressly followed and applied in the recent case of Allen v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.6 The case involved the right of the
settlor to have a trust revoked as to one-half of the corpus
as the sole beneficiary, upon the theory that a remainder of
one-half of the corpus to the settlor's "next of kin" created
a reversion. In denying its application to the deed involved, the Court clearly stated the doctrine as a rule of
construction in the following words:
"The question, therefore, is whether the deed of
trust has granted remainder interests to the next of
kin. This question must be decided by construing its
language to determine the intention of the settlor. If
a settlor manifests no intention to grant a beneficial
interest to any one else, then he is the sole beneficiary. ....
"
If this doctrine is to be applied as a rule of construction
in the deed cases, it becomes important to determine what
provisions in the deed are sufficient to indicate affirmatively an intention of the grantor that the heirs are to take
a remainder by purchase. The New York Court of Appeals, following the opinion of Justice Cardozo in Doctor v.
Hughes,6 7 has held that the existence of a provision in the
deed, giving the settlor a testamentary power of appointment, is sufficient evidence of an intention not to create a
reversion to prevent the application of the doctrine and
permit the heirs to take a remainder by purchase. 68 If the
doctrine is applied, the settlor retains a reversion, and thus
has power of disposition either by deed or will. The fact
that he has by express provision retained a power of disposition by will can only be construed as showing an intention not to have power of disposition by deed, and thereA. (2d) 180 (Md. 1939).
e Supra n. 64.
OS Wbittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929).
607
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fore the existence of an intention not to retain a reversion
but to create a remainder in the heirs by purchase. However, none of the Maryland cases which have refused to
apply this doctrine of worthier title to a remainder to the
grantor's heirs has rested its decision upon the presence of
a testamentary power of appointment, although the recent
Allen case referred to this type of provision as one factor
to be considered in determining whether the grantor intended to create a remainder by purchase in his heirs. In
fact, in the Sprigg case and the Raffel case, both of which
applied the doctrine, as well as in the Peter case and the
Allen case, both of which refused to apply the doctrine,
there existed a testamentary power of appointment in the
settlor.
A careful examination of the Maryland cases, in which
the remainder to the heirs of the grantor did satisfy the
formal requirements of the doctrine of worthier title, but
in which the Court found an intention to create a remainder in such heirs by purchase, discloses that the presence of a provision expressly and affirmatively denying to
the grantor any inter vivos power of disposition or limiting
such power has been the determinative factor in the decision. This is certainly the basis of the decision in the Peter
case, which held that the heirs took a remainder by purchase. In that case the settlor attempted to set up a
spendthrift trust for his own benefit, and the deed in trust
contained the express provision that the settlor was to have
no power "to alienate the same, or to direct the alienation
thereof, by conveyance in fee or by way of mortgage or
deed of trust". Certainly, such an express denial of any
power of disposal inter vivos over either the income or the
corpus of the trust showed affirmatively an intention of the
settlor to create a remainder in his heirs and not a reversion in himself. Likewise, in the Allen case there was an
express provision providing that the settlor could withdraw
from the corpus sums of money not exceeding $10,000 in
the aggregate. Such an express limitation on the settlor's
inter vivos control of the corpus is a clear indication of his
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intention to create a remainder in his "next of kin" and not
a reversion in himself. In Numsen v. Lyon 9 there was a
provision expressly permitting the settlor to convey inter
vivos the corpus only "with assent of the trustee testified
by his uniting in the same deed". This express restriction
on the grantor's power of disposal inter vivos negatived
any intention to retain a reversion. Only in Mercer v.
Hopkins0 has the Court of Appeals failed to apply the doctrine of worthier title to a deed which did not contain any
express denial or limitation upon the grantor's power of
disposal inter vivos. The exact wording of the deed is not
set out in the opinion, and the doctrine was urged upon the
Court under the theory of a resulting trust. Lack of argument by counsel for the grantor's devisee under the doctrine of worthier title may account for the Court's summary treatment of the problem.
On the other hand, in the two cases which did apply the
doctrine so as to create a reversion in the grantor, the
Sprigg case and the Raffel case, there was no provision in
the deed which, in any manner expressly limited or denied
to the grantor a power of disposal by an inter vivos conveyance.7 From these cases it becomes apparent that the
most determinative factor in the application of the doctrine
of worthier title to the deed cases has been the presence or
absence of a provision limiting or denying to the grantor
a power of inter vivos disposal over the corpus of the trust
property.
In several Maryland cases the remainder to the grantor's heirs has been contingent upon his dying without
children, with a first alternative remainder to such children if he dies leaving children. 72 In these cases the doctrine should not be applied to the -final remainder to his
heirs if it is a rule of construction only. As a rule of law
69 87 Md. 31, 39 A. 533 (1898).
0 88 Md. 292, 41 A. 156 (1898).
"In the Sprigg case there was a provision similar to that
Numsen v. Lyon, supra n. 69, in respect to the house and lot on
Street, but no such provision in respect to the balance of the trust
72 This is sometimes described as a contingent remainder with
aspect.

found in
Franklin
property.
a double
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it would, of course, be applicable. The fact that the
grantor has separated his heirs into two separate classes,
his lineal heirs in the first class and his collateral heirs in
the second class, and has described his lineal heirs by the
term "children" so that the doctrine would not be applicable to that class, shows an intention to make the alternative gift to his collateral heirs also a remainder by purchase. It would be unreasonable to say that he intended
the first class to take by purchase, but the second class to
take by descent. 7 This was the situation in Numsen v.
Lyon 74 and in Mercer v. Hopkins, 75 in both of which the
doctrine was not applied.
Relation to the Rule in Shelley's Case
In its development the doctrine of worthier title had no
connection with the Rule in Shelley's Case, although both
originated from a desire to protect the feudal rights of the
overlord. In the application of these two rules to wills, no
confusion can result since they deal with different types of
remainders, the former with a remainder to the testator's
heirs and the latter with a remainder to the life tenant's
heirs. It should be noted that the Rule in Shelley's Case
only deals with remainders, while the doctrine of worthier
title applies to any type of estate. However, when the doctrine of worthier title was extended to conveyances inter
vivos, there was a tendency to confuse the two rules in
those cases where the life tenant was the grantor. As previously mentioned, the most common type of remainder to
the grantor's heirs, involving the doctrine of worthier title,
arose in cases of a deed in trust in which the settlor created
a trust for his own life. In these cases the life tenant is
also the grantor, and therefore both the Rule in Shelley's
Case and the doctrine of worthier title are applicable to a
remainder to the settlor's heirs. By applying the Rule in
71 A similar argument was approved in the Allen case, where one-half of
the corpus was devised to the grantor's children or descendants and the
other one-half in default of appointment to his "next of kin".
7'87 Md. 31, 39 A. 533 (1898).
7 88 Md. 292, 41 A. 156 (1898).
See Mercer v. Safe Deposit Co., 91
Md. 102, 45 A. 865 (1900), for the wording of the deed in trust.
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Shelley's Case the settlor, as owner of the equitable life
estate, will take an equitable fee simple, and as sole beneficiary he is entitled to terminate the trust and thus regain
a legal estate in fee simple. This was the decision in Brown
v. Renshaw,76 where the Court applied the Rule in Shelley's
Case so as to give the settlor an equitable fee simple, and
then directed a reconveyance of the legal fee. On the
other hand, the same result could have been reached by
applying the doctrine of worthier title, since the settlor
would then have owned a reversion in fee, either legal or
equitable, which, merging with his equitable life estate,
would create an equitable fee simple estate, entitling him
to a reconveyance of the legal title. This was the express
holding in both the Sprigg case and the Raffel case.
A question might be raised as to whether the enactment
in 1912 of the Maryland statute abolishing the Rule in
Shelley's Case7 7 also operated to abolish the doctrine of
worthier title in those cases where the settlor was also the
life tenant. The statute provides that where a remainder
is limited to the heirs of the life tenant, such heirs "shall
take as purchaser". This wording could reasonably be
construed to prevent the application of the doctrine of
worthier title to remainders to the settlor's heirs where the
settlor also held an equitable life estate, as was the situation in both the Sprigg case and the Raffel case. However, it should be noted that the New York Court of Appeals has construed its statute, worded identically as the
Maryland statute, 7 as not preventing the application of the
79
doctrine of worthier title to such a situation.
705 7 Md. 67 (1881).
Md.
M Code (1924) Art. 93, See. 342.
78 The Maryland statute was copied from that of New York.
Construction of Wills (1927) Sec. 364, n. 1.
71 Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).

See Miller,
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CONCLUSION

From the preceding analysis of the Maryland cases, it is
apparent that the application of the doctrine of worthier
title as a rule of law in the will cases is a legal anachronism
and should be abolished. It serves no useful purpose in
the solution of modern problems in wills, and may operate
to defeat the intention of the testator as to the order in
which his assets should be used to pay his debts. For these
reasons the Restatement of Property has taken the liberty
of stating that this doctrine no longer exists, either as a rule
of law or as a rule of construction, in respect to devises in
wills."0 Likewise Section 14 of the Uniform Property Act
specifically abolishes this doctrine as applied to wills.
However, this same doctrine, when applied to conveyances inter vivos as a rule of construction, "is justified on
the basis that it represents the probable intention of the
average conveyor. Where a person makes a gift in remainder to his own heirs (particularly where he also gives
himself an estate for life) he seldom intends to create an
indestructible interest in those persons who take his property by intestacy, but intends the same thing as if he had
given the remainder 'to my estate' -.
"
For this reason the
Restatement of Property has stated the doctrine as a rule
82
of construction where applied to conveyances inter vivos.
Section 15 of the Uniform Property Act, however, specifically abolishes this doctrine, both as a rule of law and as
a rule of construction, as applied to conveyances inter
vivos. Since the Maryland Court of Appeals has always
applied the doctrine as a rule of construction in the deed
cases, Section 15 should not be adopted in this State.3 To
adopt Section 15 would be to defeat the intention of the
settlor in many cases where, in creating a trust for his own
life, he had no intention to create an indestructible interest
in his heirs.
60

Restatement, Property, Tentative Draft No. 11, Sec. 314 (2).

lIbid, Sec. 314, Comm. a.

Ibid, Sec. 314 (1).
" For a general discussion of the Uniform Property Act see the other
leading article appearing in this issue of the REvEw-ED.

